From the Qin up to the Qing Dynasties, officials appointed by the central government in imperial China were not only beholden to their superiors but also acted as brokers for local interests. We characterize such a structural position as having “dual accountability.” Although accountability to superiors is readily understandable within the Weberian framework of bureaucratic hierarchy, the reasons behind local accountability needs an explanation. This paper attempts to explain how officials worked for their regional interests by analyzing the dual accountability in the East Han Dynasty (25-220 AD). By investigating the larger contexts of the government structure, political ideology, and personnel system of the time, we offer three explanations in this paper: practical necessity, “Confucian” ideology, and reputational mechanism. These explanations have each been supported by empirical evidence from multiple sources, including administrative records and inscriptions on ancient stelae. In addition, we question Weber’s analysis of the Chinese imperial governing system and present new ideas about the social rationality underlying an “inefficient” system that was in place for two millennia.